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WHO MUST TESTIFY?:
THE LIMITS OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE WHEN IT IS APPLIED TO
FORENSIC LABORATORY REPORTS
Andrew Arons*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees, inter alia, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”1 When interpreting this provision, which has been
deemed the “Confrontation Clause,”2 the U.S. Supreme Court
observed that “a primary interest secured by [the provision] is the
right of cross-examination.”3 In Ohio v. Roberts,4 the Court
summarized its long-standing approach to addressing whether and to
what extent the Confrontation Clause guaranteed a criminal
defendant the right to cross-examine individuals who made out-ofcourt statements.5 Roberts held that such statements were
constitutionally admissible absent cross-examination so long as the
declarant was “unavailable” and the statement “b[ore] adequate
‘indicia of reliability.’”6
The Court reversed course in Crawford v. Washington.7 There,
Justice Antonin Scalia led a six-Justice majority in holding that,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.S., Business
Administration, June 2010, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona. I want to extend my
thanks to Professor Justin Levitt for his invaluable assistance with this Comment. I also thank
Marty Koresawa and Allen Haroutounian. Lastly, I am grateful for the support that my friends
and family have provided for me during three long and arduous years of law school.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. E.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1152 (2011).
3. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965).
4. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. As is the case in the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Comment refers to such individuals
as “declarants.” See FED. R. EVID. 801.
6. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
7. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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absent the in-court testimony of the declarant,8 the Confrontation
Clause prohibits the prosecution from introducing out-of-court
“testimonial statements”9 unless the declarant is unavailable to testify
in court and the criminal defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine that person.10 The Court reasoned that, in drafting the Sixth
Amendment, the Framers intended to have the right to cross-examine
the declarant be a necessary, and not merely a sufficient, means of
testing the out-of-court statement’s reliability.11
Five years later, in the 5−4 decision of Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,12 the Court expanded Crawford’s scope by holding
that reports prepared by forensic laboratories are “testimonial
statements.”13 Thus, absent a showing that those involved in the
report’s production were unavailable and that the defendant “had a
prior opportunity to cross-examine them,” the Confrontation Clause
required “the analysts” to testify.14 The dissenters raised a slew of
arguments, including that the Court’s holding failed to clearly state
which analysts need to testify to satisfy the Confrontation Clause,
that it imposed high costs on the government by requiring the
prosecution to call forensic analysts every time it offers forensic
laboratory reports, and that it created a rule that was unnecessary
given the reliability of such reports.15
Three years later in Williams v. Illinois,16 a fractured Court17
heard another case involving the Confrontation Clause’s application

8. The Court concluded that a declarant of an out-of-court statement is a “witness” for the
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 51.
9. The Court later defined “testimonial statements” as out-of-court statements that have the
“primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). This Comment would not alter
Davis’s definition of “testimonial” because restricting the protections of the Confrontation Clause
to only statements (e.g., forensic reports) that are “certified” and “sworn to” would improperly
value form over substance. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2275−77 (2012) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
10. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 53−54.
11. Id. at 55−56, 61.
12. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
13. See id. at 306, 310−11.
14. Id. at 311.
15. See id. at 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen
Breyer and Samuel Alito joined Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissenting opinion. Id. at 330. The
Court later reiterated that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial. Bullcoming v. New Mexico,
131 S. Ct. 2705, 2709−10 (2011).
16. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
17. Id. at 2227.
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to forensic laboratory reports.18 The plurality, which consisted of the
four justices who dissented in Melendez-Diaz,19 concluded that the
prosecution’s introduction of a laboratory report in Williams did not
violate the Confrontation Clause.20
Just as the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz were concerned about
the Court’s imprecise application of the Confrontation Clause to
forensic laboratory reports,21 so too was Justice Breyer in Williams.
In his concurring opinion, he emphasized that Melendez-Diaz
provides “no logical stopping place” with regard to the number of
witnesses who need to be called.22 Noting that as many as six
analysts can work on a particular DNA profile,23 Justice Breyer was
apprehensive that the prosecution would need to call all of them to
satisfy the Confrontation Clause.24
Because of this perceived problem, he posed the following
question: “Who should the prosecution have . . . to call to testify”
when it offers a forensic laboratory report against a criminal
defendant?25 Answering this question is of immense importance
because judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys need to know
how to constitutionally try their cases.26 And despite the fact that
Williams is now the third time in three years that the Supreme Court
has applied the Confrontation Clause in the context of laboratory
reports,27 the answer is no clearer. Moreover, although the plurality
did not expressly state a concern that Melendez-Diaz’s imprecise
application would impose high costs on the government, it is fair to
assume that such concern played a role, since the plurality strained
its analysis to conclude that there was no Confrontation Clause
violation.28 Consequently, this Comment strives to answer Justice
Breyer’s question.
18. Id. (plurality opinion).
19. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 306.
20. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
21. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 2252−55.
24. See id. at 2247.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2248.
27. Two years before Williams, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause should apply to
laboratory reports. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310−11 (2009). One year
before Williams, the Court again reached the same conclusion. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131
S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
28. See infra Part III.A.
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Part II of this Comment presents the facts and procedural history
of Williams v. Illinois. Part III describes how a fractured Court
attempted to resolve the Confrontation Clause issue in the case. Part
IV proposes an answer to Justice Breyer’s question, which animated
the controversy in both Williams and its precursors: when the
prosecution offers a forensic laboratory report against a criminal
defendant, the Confrontation Clause requires the prosecution to (1)
call all of the analysts who tested the evidence at issue or (2) call a
supervisor29 who authored the laboratory report and witnessed all
stages of the testing of the evidence either firsthand or by watching a
videotape (or like medium) that recorded the actual testing. 30 This
approach is consistent with Crawford’s principles31 and effectuates
the objective of reliability without unduly burdening the
government.32
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 10, 2000, a young woman (designated by the
initials “L.J.”) was raped in Chicago, Illinois.33 After she reported the
crime, the police took swabs of semen found in her vagina.34
Defendant Sandy Williams was not a suspect at that time.35 The
police then sent the samples to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory
(“Cellmark”) for testing, and Cellmark sent back a report that
described a male DNA profile.36 Although two “reviewers” signed
the report, they did not certify or formally swear to its contents.37
29. As a shorthand, this Comment will refer to the supervisor defined here as a “supervisor
with personal knowledge.” Such supervisors presumably have the expertise to meaningfully
evaluate the results of each stage of the testing.
30. The prosecution would have to comply with this rule unless all of the appropriate
declarants are unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. The
appropriate declarants would be all of the analysts unless a supervisor observed the testing and
authored the report.
31. Because it is consistent with Crawford, this proposal permits the defendant an
opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61
(2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause requires that the reliability of evidence “be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination”).
32. As discussed in Part IV.A, in the event that any other person makes a “testimonial”
statement that is relied upon in the laboratory report offered by the prosecution, the prosecution
would need to call that individual to the stand in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.
33. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2229 (2012) (plurality opinion).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).

Winter 2013]

WHO MUST TESTIFY?

725

On August 3, 2000, the police drew Williams’s blood after he
had been arrested on charges unrelated to the L.J. rape.38 A state
forensic laboratory tested the blood and prepared a DNA profile that
was stored in an electronic database.39 Later, Sandra Lambatos, a
forensic technician at a state police laboratory, checked the electronic
database to see if any DNA profiles matched the one provided in the
Cellmark report.40 The computer indicated that the DNA profile of
Williams’s blood matched the DNA profile prepared by Cellmark.41
After L.J. identified Williams as her attacker in a lineup
conducted on April 17, 2001, he was formally indicted for her rape.42
During Williams’s bench trial in 2006, the prosecution called a state
laboratory forensic scientist who had verified the presence of semen
on the swabs before they were purportedly sent off to Cellmark.43
The prosecution also called the state analyst who had developed the
DNA profile from Williams’s blood.44 The state did not call any
employee from Cellmark.45
After the two other analysts testified, the prosecution called
Lambatos to the stand.46 The prosecutor asked her: “Was there a
computer match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.] to a male DNA profile that had been
identified as having originated from Sandy Williams?”47 Over an
objection from the defense, Lambatos answered in the affirmative.48
The prosecution next asked Lambatos if she had compared the two
DNA profiles and concluded that they matched.49 She answered in
the affirmative to both of those questions.50
The defense moved to exclude Lambatos’s testimony regarding
the Cellmark DNA profile on Confrontation Clause grounds because

38. Id. at 2229 (plurality opinion).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2230.
46. Id. at 2229.
47. Id. at 2267 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Id. at 2230 (plurality opinion).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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no analyst from Cellmark had testified.51 The prosecution responded
that Lambatos’s testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause
because under the Illinois Rules of Evidence, experts are allowed to
rely on facts of which they do not have personal knowledge to
explain the basis of their opinions.52 The trial judge denied the
motion and later found Williams guilty.53
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed in relevant part on the
basis that, under state law, the report was offered merely to provide a
foundation for Lambatos’s expert opinion (i.e., that the two DNA
profiles matched) and not for its truth (i.e., the Cellmark profile and
its accurateness).54 The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed for the
same reasons.55 After granting certiorari on the issue of whether
Lambatos’s testimony concerning the Cellmark report violated the
Confrontation Clause, a divided U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment.56
III. THE FRACTURED COURT’S ATTEMPT
TO RESOLVE WILLIAMS
The Court issued four different opinions in Williams.57 Justice
Alito authored a plurality opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined. Justice Kagan wrote a dissent,
joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Justice Breyer
wrote a separate concurrence, and Justice Thomas concurred only in
the judgment.58
A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality, led by Justice Samuel Alito, concluded that the
Confrontation Clause did not bar the state analyst from testifying
about Cellmark’s DNA profile.59 Justice Alito reasoned that this
evidence was not being offered for its truth but, instead, merely to
explain the basis of the expert’s opinion that there had been a DNA

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 2231.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2231−32.
See id. at 2227−28, 2232.
Id. at 2221.
Id.
Id. at 2227–28.
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match between the defendant’s blood and (whatever) DNA sample
was in Cellmark’s possession.60 According to the plurality, testifying
that the blood DNA profile matched the profile from the semen was
no different from expert testimony that a particular configuration of
the DNA profile produced from the semen would have matched the
DNA profile from Williams’s blood.61 Because Crawford held that
statements that are not offered for their truth are not “testimonial,”62
the plurality concluded that Lambatos’s testimony about the
Cellmark report did not violate the Confrontation Clause.63
Further, as an independent basis of the plurality’s conclusion
that the report was not “testimonial,” Justice Alito determined that
Cellmark’s report was not generated for the “primary purpose of
accusing a targeted individual.” He arrived at this conclusion because
the police did not know that Williams was a suspect at the time the
sample was being tested or that the DNA profile would inculpate
Williams.64 Rather, Justice Alito concluded that the report’s “primary
purpose was to catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large[,]”65
thus diminishing the “prospect of fabrication . . . .”66 The plurality
concluded that this “primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual” test was appropriate based on its interpretation of the
facts of Crawford and its progeny.67
B. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Although Justice Stephen Breyer joined the plurality opinion, he
would have rather set the case for reargument.68 He wanted the
parties to help the Court decide who should testify if the prosecution
introduces a forensic laboratory report.69 Concerned about the cost
implications for the government, Justice Breyer pointed out that
under the Court’s precedent, all of the analysts who test a forensic
60. Id. at 2236, 2238.
61. See id. at 2238.
62. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59−60 n.9 (2004).
63. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2238−40 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 2243–44.
65. Id. at 2243.
66. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
67. Id. at 2242–43. Justice Alito went on to say that laboratory analysts are generally neutral
and probably do not fabricate forensic results. Id. at 2244. This conclusion appears to contradict
Melendez-Diaz’s rationale. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
68. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 2247.
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sample may have to testify because analysts “regularly rely on the
technical statements and results of other [analysts] to form their own
opinions.”70 In the absence of reargument on this issue, Justice
Breyer relied on the dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico71 to conclude that laboratory reports were
not testimonial.72
C. Justice Thomas’s Concurrence
in the Judgment
Although Justice Clarence Thomas concluded that Lambatos’s
testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, he refused to
adopt the plurality’s reasoning because he concluded that testimony
offered to explain the basis of an expert’s testimony is always
offered for its truth.73 This is because if the underlying facts are not
true, the expert’s opinion is irrelevant.74 Moreover, Justice Thomas
concluded that the plurality’s “primary purpose test” was flawed
because it “lack[ed] any grounding in constitutional text, in history,
or in logic.”75
However, Justice Thomas still concluded that Cellmark’s report
was not testimonial because its authors had neither certified nor
sworn to it. Thus, it did not have sufficient “‘indicia of solemnity.’”76
He stated that the solemnity rule would not allow prosecutors to
circumvent the Confrontation Clause because its scope “reaches the
use of technically informal statements when used to evade the
formalized process.”77

70. Id. at 2246.
71. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
72. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 2255, 2257 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
74. See id. at 2257 & n.1.
75. Id. at 2261–62.
76. Id. at 2259−60 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 837 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
77. Id. at 2260 n.5 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The legal effect of Justice Thomas’s
conclusion regarding whether a statement is “testimonial” is unclear because the plurality’s and
Justice Thomas’s opinions rest on “two essentially distinct rationales.” See Linda Novak, The
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 763–67
(1980).
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D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the dissent, would have held
that the analyst’s testimony concerning Cellmark’s report violated
the Confrontation Clause.78 She agreed with Justice Thomas that the
report was offered for its truth because “the factfinder must assess
the truth of the out-of-court statement—i.e., Cellmark’s DNA profile
was produced from the semen found in L.J. and was accurate—in
order “to determine the validity of the [testifying analyst’s]
conclusion” that the semen profile matched the defendant’s blood
profile.79 Justice Kagan also concluded that the plurality’s new
“primary purpose” test was flawed for essentially the same reasons
that Justice Thomas rejected it.80
However, she refused to adopt Justice Thomas’s definition of
“testimonial” because she believed that it would “grant[]
constitutional significance to minutia.”81 Moreover, Justice Kagan
did not believe that Justice Thomas’s evasion test would prevent
prosecutors from circumventing the Confrontation Clause (by using
laboratory reports that are not certified or sworn to, for example)
because he did not explain how the test was workable.82
IV. ANALYSIS
A majority of the Court (both Justice Thomas and the dissent)
subscribes to the belief that the Confrontation Clause’s purpose is to
test the reliability of testimonial statements through crossexamination.83 Conversely, the plurality seems to believe that the
Clause’s purpose is to ensure the reliability of testimony so long as
doing so does not impose unreasonably high costs on the
government, and that cross-examination is not the sole method of
constitutionally ensuring reliability.84 Therefore, there is one key
issue that separates the two camps: Who, if anyone, has to be
available for cross-examination when the prosecution introduces a
78. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2268–69.
80. See id. at 2272–73.
81. Id. at 2275–76.
82. See id. at 2276 n.7.
83. See id. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004)); id. at 2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 317 (2009)).
84. See, e.g., id. at 2227, 2239 (plurality opinion).
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forensic report? This Comment argues that the prosecution should be
required to call either all of the analysts who analyzed the sample or
a supervisor with personal knowledge. Such an approach effectuates
both camps’ purposes because it is consistent with Crawford’s
principles and effectuates the goal of reliability without unduly
burdening the government.
A. Calling All of the Analysts
Is Generally Mandated by Crawford’s Principles
Crawford and its progeny have announced certain doctrinal
principles intended to safeguard a defendant’s right to cross-examine
witnesses. Crawford held that unless the declarant is unavailable and
the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him or her,
“testimonial statements” are admissible only if the prosecution calls
the declarant to the stand at trial.85 Two years later, Davis v.
Washington86 further defined “testimonial statements” as those that
have the “primary purpose” of “establish[ing] or prov[ing] past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”87 This
Comment’s proposal is consistent with these principles.
Producing all of the analysts that test a relevant piece of forensic
evidence is ordinarily mandated by Crawford’s requirement that
declarants be subject to cross-examination.88 As Justice Breyer
pointed out, when a particular forensic sample works its way through
the testing process, the analysts “regularly rely on the technical
statements and results of other [analysts] to form their own
opinions,” thus rendering the final laboratory report the culmination
of “layer upon layer of technical statements (express or implied)
made by one expert and relied upon by another.”89 Because, in the
absence of a supervisor with personal knowledge, the final laboratory
report is really a collection of testimonial statements—i.e., each
analyst explicitly or implicitly communicates the results of a
particular part of a procedure that are in turn used to establish the
85. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54.
86. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
87. Id. at 822.
88. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54.
89. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring). For instance, in a typical DNA test,
the technicians who subject the DNA to electrophoresis (so as to get a visual depiction of the
genetic material) rely on the assumption that another analyst had properly amplified the DNA
earlier. See id. at 2252−55.
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guilt of the defendant—all of the analysts in the chain of testing
would need to testify to satisfy Crawford. Having them all testify
would allow the defendant to point out whether an analyst
erroneously or disingenuously performed any of the testing stages.
Justice Kennedy believes that Crawford’s application to forensic
testing is more expansive because it could require the prosecution to
call individuals who calibrate the machines that analysts use. 90 His
conclusion is incorrect because although analysts may rely on these
statements in arriving at their final results, the calibrators probably
do not primarily intend for their statements to be used in a trial
against the accused. This is not only because a calibrator may be an
independent contractor hired specifically to perform that task,91 but
also because such calibrations are ordinarily not made for particular
criminal cases.92 Rather, the laboratory analysts who handle the
sample or a supervisor with personal knowledge tend to be the only
individuals during the testing of the forensic evidence who make
testimonial statements.93 Because calibrators do not typically respond
to requests from law enforcement officials regarding particular cases,
they have less of an incentive to falsify results or to forsake acting
with due care.94
B. Effectuating the Goal of Reliability
Without Unduly Burdening the Government
This section describes ways to accommodate the constitutional
command that not only yield the benefit of reliability but also avoid
imposing substantial costs on state and federal governments.

90. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 332–33 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
91. See id. at 332.
92. See id. at 311 n.1 (majority opinion); see, e.g., 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 23.03[b] (2011) (explaining that some instruments used
for a type of drug testing require “daily or weekly adjustments”).
93. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2252–55 (Breyer, J., concurring) (summarizing with a
diagram a typical DNA test in which only analysts work on the DNA sample).
94. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318. Personnel in the shipping department of the
laboratory may make testimonial statements relied upon by analysts because such employees
record the receipt of evidence relevant to particular criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 535−36 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a form pertaining to particular evidence
“indicated that the bag had been received on [a particular date], with its seal unbroken”).
Consequently, the Court may conclude that such individuals have the incentive to falsify those
records or to manage them negligently.
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1. Benefits of Cross-Examination
of Forensic Analysts
The Justices who joined the plurality opinion have claimed that
the Constitution does not mandate that forensic analysts be crossexamined as a condition to a laboratory report’s admission, in part
because there is no perceptible benefit to such a requirement.95
However, cross-examination does have value in this context because
it allows defendants to show the fact-finder that an analyst lied or
made a mistake. For instance, the dissent in Williams cited a
California case in which Cellmark had mistakenly switched the
defendant’s and victim’s DNA samples in a rape case; the report thus
erroneously concluded that DNA on the victim’s sweater matched
the defendant’s DNA.96 Although the error was revealed on redirect
examination of an analyst,97 the mistake was a perfect candidate for
cross-examination because the defendant had discovered the grounds
on which he could challenge the validity of the report98 and could
have addressed it by questioning the witness. And had the expert not
been required to testify as to the error, it would have been more
difficult for the defense to challenge the report’s accuracy.99
Therefore, cross-examination can only help ensure that forensic
evidence is reliable.
2. The Costs and the Measures
that Minimize Them
a. The costs
The members of the Williams plurality claimed that it is too
costly to require the government to call forensic analysts to introduce
the forensic reports. That is because doing so would require analysts
95. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 338–40, 343 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
96. Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264−65 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Reporter's Partial
Transcript at 3−4, People v. Kocak, No. SCD110465 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 1995), available at
http://www.nlada.org/forensics/for_lib/Documents/1037341561.0/JohnIvanKocak.pdf).
97. Reporter's Partial Transcript, supra note 96, at 2.
98. William C. Thompson, DNA Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV.
827, 845 (1996).
99. The plurality contended that the defendant’s right to subpoena a state forensic analyst is
an adequate safeguard for reliability. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion); id. at
2251−52 (Breyer, J., concurring). However, holding that the analyst’s testimony is not a condition
of the report’s admissibility would make it more difficult for the defendant to challenge the
validity of the report if the declarant refuses to testify or is otherwise unavailable. See MelendezDiaz, 557 U.S. at 324.
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to leave their posts and courts to accommodate scheduling
conflicts.100 The plurality asserted that these costs would cause
prosecutors to rely on less reliable evidence, like eyewitness
testimony.101 However, as Justice Scalia noted, the cost assumptions
relied upon by the members of the plurality are founded on the
unsupported assumptions that, in all unsettled criminal cases, no
defendant will ever stipulate to a report’s findings and every
defendant will object to the evidence and therefore demand that the
appropriate analyst appear to testify102 Furthermore, there are
measures available to jurisdictions that can help them ameliorate
costs incurred.
b. Measure #1:
Consolidation
One measure is to reduce the number of analysts who work on
forensic samples. Doing so would lessen the burden on the
government because the Confrontation Clause would require fewer
analysts to be taken away from their posts, and the courts would need
to accommodate fewer scheduling conflicts. To accomplish this,
jurisdictions can have analysts consolidate the different roles in the
testing process.103 For instance, the appendix to Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion in Williams demonstrates that in a typical DNA
testing procedure, one analyst looks for biological materials in the
sample and while another extracts DNA from the swabbing.104 The
laboratories might be able to consolidate these two positions because
examination and extraction likely do not require substantially
disparate expertise and training.105
100. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 340–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissenters in those cases were
the members of the plurality in Williams. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.
101. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (plurality opinion).
102. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325 n.10. Defendants may wish to stipulate to the results of
the test so as to not emphasize its contents through live testimony. Id. at 328.
103. One may argue that in some jurisdictions, consolidating positions would be very costly
because the possible reduction in efficiency may contribute to the backlogs suffered by forensic
laboratories. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC LABORATORIES 4 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl09.pdf (“The 411 publicly funded crime labs . . . had a backlog of about 1.2
million requests [at the end of 2009].”). In those circumstances, it may still be cost-effective to
outsource any excess work to private laboratories, as was done in Williams.
104. See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2252–55 (Breyer, J., concurring).
105. Forensic laboratories often use a “rotation system” in which “each technician performs
an assigned task for a week (e.g., DNA extraction) and then rotates to a different task the next
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c. Measure #2:
“Notice-and-Demand” Statutes
Statutory measures constitute another cost-cutting option. The
Melendez-Diaz majority spoke favorably of “notice-and-demand”
statutes. These laws require the defendant to raise Confrontation
Clause challenges in writing within a specified period of time before
trial, so long as the prosecution has provided written notice that it
will introduce a forensic laboratory report. If the defendant fails to
timely raise an objection, this constitutes a waiver.106 Such statutes
should help limit the costs of having analysts and supervisors testify
because defendants may choose not to object if there is no apparent
defect in the forensic report or if the defendant would like to stipulate
to those facts (so as to not emphasize the laboratory’s adverse
findings through analyst testimony).107
However, the members of the plurality have suggested that
notice-and-demand statutes are ineffective because defendants have
an incentive to require the prosecution to call the analysts so as to
obtain the chance of windfall if the witnesses cannot attend trial (e.g.,
because attendance is too costly).108 Nevertheless, this phenomenon
is unlikely due to the fact that the risk of nonattendance is low. This
is because the plurality’s cost assumptions are unfounded,109
“[c]ourts are highly deferential to the analysts’ schedules and
liberally grant continuances to accommodate their conflicts,”110 and

week (e.g., DNA amplification).” Brief of Amici Curiae for New York County District Attorney's
Office and the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Support of Respondents
at 4, Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 5125054, at *6−7
(italics omitted). The fact that DNA technicians are frequently assigned different tasks in the
testing process suggests that each of those technicians probably has similar expertise and training.
106. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 326–27.
107. See id. at 326−28. Empirical support for this proposition may be demonstrated by the
experience of Michigan, which has a “notice-and-demand” statute. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2167 (2012). The statute may be partially responsible for the fact that the increase in the
percentage of tests for which analysts provided testimony in the state of Michigan between 2006
and 2010 (which includes a stretch of time after Melendez-Diaz) was a mere 0.3 percent. See
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2719 n.10 (opinion of Ginsburg, J.). The only other
justice to joint this portion of the opinion was Justice Scalia. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
108. See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 354 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. See supra Part IV.B.2.a.
110. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, et al., in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-10876), 2010 WL 5043098, at *4.
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other measures discussed in this Comment reduce the burden on the
government.111
d. Measure #3:
Supervisor with Personal Knowledge
Allowing the prosecution to call a supervisor with personal
knowledge instead of all of the analysts who worked on the evidence
is another way to satisfy Crawford. The approach does not violate
Crawford’s requirement that the declarant testify because, if the
supervisor actually observed the testing and wrote the report, his or
her report would not rely on the statements made by other
analysts.112 Rather, it would simply be the supervisor’s declaration of
a fact. Cross-examination would be meaningful because the
supervisor’s report would be the product of his or her own analysis,
and would reflect his or her own “perception, memory, narration, and
sincerity.”113 Thus, the defendant could adequately test each of these
qualities of the report on cross-examination.114 Furthermore, if a
testing analyst committed an error or attempted to fabricate the
results of the test, cross-examining the supervisor could elicit that
fact because he or she would have observed the whole analysis.
This measure is also an excellent cost-saving option. In such a
scenario, the government needs to call only a single analyst, rather
than endure the costs entailed by calling multiple analysts. Therefore,
111. Arguably, notice-and-demand statutes also impose costs on criminal defendants by
causing them to miss out on the opportunity to raise Confrontation Clause objections when
defense counsel learns something new and important during trial, is overworked, or otherwise
overlooks an evidentiary issue. Pamela R. Meltzer, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV.
475, 517 (2006). Even if that is true, the statute may be worth this cost on the defense because the
proposal’s attempt to safeguard the defense’s right to meaningfully cross-examine witnesses at
each stage of the testing might be rejected if notice-and-demand statutes were not permitted by
the proposed rule.
112. The supervisor with personal knowledge who watches a tape would not be relying on a
“testimonial statement” made by the camera because an unedited video has no human declarant.
Cf. DAVID P. LEONARD & VICTOR J. GOLD, EVIDENCE: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 143 (2d ed.
2008) (“If the goal of the hearsay rule is to require percipient witnesses to be called to testify and
be subjected to cross-examination rather than allow their observations to be proved through
hearsay witnesses, nothing would be gained by requiring the in-court testimony of an animal.”).
113. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2249 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
114. This conclusion is not contradicted by Bullcoming v. New Mexico, because, unlike the
testifying surrogate analyst in that case, a supervisor with personal knowledge has “observe[d] the
test reported in the certification.” 131 S. Ct. at 2710. In fact, Justice Sotomayor expressly left the
door open for this option when she stated that Bullcoming might have been decided differently
had “a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test testified about the results or a report
about such results.” Id. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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this course of action would impose no more of a burden on the
government than did Melendez-Diaz.
However, it may not always be feasible for supervisors to be
physically present when the particular test is conducted. In those
circumstances, having the supervisor watch a videotape (or like
medium) of the entire test would be a practicable substitute.115
Moreover, even if the video quality in a particular case is
somewhat questionable, both the prosecution’s and the defense’s
interests are accommodated by this measure. The prosecution gets to
admit the results of the report, while the defense, through crossexamination, can expose the witness’ perception problems by
pointing out the inadequacies of the tape that the supervisor relied
upon. Further, if the testing procedures have been captured on
videotape, the defense can more easily monitor the testing so as to
determine whether an analyst committed an error or falsified results.
The defense can then confront the supervisor with the issues
discovered on the videotape and diminish the reliability of the report.
Finally, so long as each test is recorded on tape, the prosecution
can choose to require a supervisor to watch the tape only when it
knows that the case is going to trial. Thus, the supervisor need not
waste his or her time on examining tests for which the prosecution
does not need to produce a laboratory report at trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Kagan correctly observed that “[the five Justices who
controlled the outcome of Williams] have left significant confusion
in their wake.”116 Part of the cause of this fractured decision is “four
Justices’ desire to limit Melendez-Diaz . . . in whatever way
possible.”117 However, much of the confusion and dissention could
be eliminated by this Comment’s proposal. By clarifying the
government’s constitutional obligations in the context of forensic
115. Jurisdictions may find the videotape approach to be much cheaper than having all of the
analysts who worked on the sample testify. Nevertheless, this approach may not be appropriate
for forensic testing that relies on senses other than sight or hearing. See, e.g., Catherine de Lange,
Casey Anthony Trial: Is the ‘Smell of Death’ Evidence?, NEWSCIENTIST (May 17, 2011),
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20487-casey-anthony-trial-is-the-smell-of-deathevidence.html (discussing a forensic test that detects a decomposed body via a “smell test”). In
those odd cases, the government can still call all of the analysts or a supervisor with personal
knowledge who was physically present.
116. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2277 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
117. Id.
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laboratory reports, the Court would accommodate the cost-related
concerns of the plurality while holding true to the doctrinal
underpinnings of Crawford. Doing so would provide much needed
“guidance to lower court judges and predictability to litigating
parties.”118

118. Id.

738

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:721

